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TORTS
CHILD'S RIGHT OF ACTION FOR PRENATAL INJURIES
Williams, an infant, brought an action by her next friend against the
Marion Rapid Transit Company to recover damages for prenatal injuries
suffered by her while a viable child (one sufficiently developed that it might
live separate from its mother). She alleged her mother fell from the steps of
a bus negligently operated by the transit company. The trial court sustained a
demurrer by the transit company to the petition and rendered judgment in its
favor. On appeal the court of appeals reversed.' Since this judgment con-
flicted with that of another court of appeals,2 the record was certified to the
Supreme Court of Ohio, which affirmed the recognition of a cause of action.
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N. E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949).
Actions for the recovery of damages resulting from prenatal injuries have
arisen in two ways: Where the child after birth brought an action by his next
friend as in the Williams case; and where the parents brought an action under
the wrongful death statutes.3 Under the death statutes the parents have no
action unless the child could have maintained an action had he lived.4  Thus,
the problem is basically the same in both: Can a child maintain an action to
recover damages for prenatal injuries? Though the great weight of authority
has denied a cause of action for prenatal injuries,5 two recent cases are in
accord with the Williams case in allowing an action where the child was viable
at the time the injury was inflicted.
1. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 82 N. E.2d 423 (Ohio 1949).
2. Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N. E.2d 421 (Ohio 1949).
3. See Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N. W. 710 (1937) ; -Verkennes v.
Corniea, 38 N. W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 Atl. 704
(1901).
4. On this point, most statutes are similar to the Indiana death statute. InD. STAT.
ANN. (Burns 1933) § 2-404:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of
another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an
action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained
an action had he or she (as the case may be) lived, against the latter for
an injury for the same act or omission.
5. Against recovery: Stanford v. St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So.
566 (1926) ; Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E.2d 446 (1939) ; Alliance v.
St. Lukes Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900) ; Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass.
14 (1884) ; Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 20, 274 N. W. 710 (1937) ; Buel v. United Ry.
Co., 248 Mo. 126, 15 S. W. 71 (1913) ; Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A.2d 489
(1942) ; Ryan v. P. S. C. T., 18 N. J. Misc. 429 (1940) ; In re Roberts' Estate, 158 Misc.
698, 286 N. Y. S. 476 (1936) ; Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 N. Y. App. Div. 667,
139 N. Y. S. 367 (1913); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940);
Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901) ; Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co.,
177 S. W.2d 350 (Tex. 1943) ; Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347,
78 S. W.2d 944 (1935) ; Lipps v. Milwaukee Ry. & Light, 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916
(1916).
6. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. C. 1946) (Action by child by next friend);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N. W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949); (Action under wrongful death
statute. Here the child died before it was born.)
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In most of the cases involving prenatal injuries, it has been advocated that
the tort law, by analogy to criminal law and property law, should recognize an
unborn child as a person in being.7  The courts formerly rejected this argu-
ment, saying that in order to protect social and property interests a "fiction"
has arisen that an unborn child is in being but that this "fiction" should not
be invoked to protect personal security.s The recent cases have found the
protection of an unborn child's personal security to be equally important as
the protection of social and property interests,' but have impliedly limited the
protection to the personal interests of a viable child.10 This restriction seems
7. See Alliance v. St. Lukes Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900) ; Dietrich v.
Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) ; Ryan v. P. S. C. T., 18 N. J. Misc. 429 (1940) ;
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 N. Y. App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. S. 367 (1913);
Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901).
In criminal law one who inflicts an injury on a child "in utero" causing the child to
die after it is born alive, is guilty of homicide. Clark v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671
(1898) ; The Queen v. West, 2 Car. & K. 784, 175 Eng. Rep. 329 (1848) ; Rex v. Senior,
1 Mood 346, 168 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1832).
In property law a child before birth may be considered in being for the purposes of:
Taking by will. In re Wells' will, 129 Misc. 447, 221 N. Y. S. 714 (1927). Taking by
descent. Barnett v. Pinkston, 238 Ala. 327, 191 So. 371 (1939) ; Seal v. Sexton, 144 N. C.
157, 56 S. E. 691 (1907). Taking by statute of distribution, Wallis v. Hodson, 2 Atk. 114,
26 Eng. Rep. 472 (1740). Being granted an injunction to restrain waste. Thelluson v.
Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 322, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (1799). Also a child en ventre sa
mere at the testator's death is a "life in being" within the statute against perpetuities, and a
trust estate may be created, and the absolute ownership of the property suspended, until
such child attains the age of 21. Cooper v. Heatherton, 65 N. Y. App. 561, 73 N. Y. S.
14 (1901).
8. See Alliance v. St. Lukes Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900); Ryan v.
P. S. C. T., 18 N. J. Misc. 429, 433 (1940) ; Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 173, 49 At].
704, 705 (1901).
9. Thomas, J., in Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 N. Y. App. Div. 667, 139
N. Y. S. 367 (1913), said:
It is to this conclusion that an unborn child is not in existence so as
to be entitled to the protection of his person as well as his property that
I dissent. It is not helpful to characterize its existence as fictitious as
to property rights. The rights are accorded to it. The indisputable fact
is that one is answerable to the criminal law for killing an unborn child
who to that end is regarded as in esse, and the further fact is that the
unborn child, so far as the property interests are concerned, is regarded
as an entity, a human being with the remedies usually accorded to an
owner. But the argument then proceeds that one must respect the rights
of ownership, and, so far as a civil remedy is concerned, disregard the
safety of the owner. In such argument there is not true sense of pro-
portion in the protection of rights. The greater is denied; the one lesser
and dependent on the very existence of a person in esse and entitled to
protection is respected.
See note 6 supra.
10. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D. C. 1946) ; Verkennes v. Corniea,
38 N. W.2d 838, 841 (Minn. 1949) ; Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 87 N. E.2d 334,
339 (Ohio 1949). This distinction between viable and non-viable children seems to stem
from the first case dealing with prenatal injuries in this country. Dietrich v. North-
hampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). In that case the court refused recovery for prenatal
injuries sustained by a non-viable child, saying that until a child has reached a stage in
which he is capable of being born alive and existing apart from the mother he is not a
.RECENT CASES
inappropriate since no such distinction exists in criminal and property law."
Along with the legal technicalities involved in determining an unborn
child to be a person in being, there were also practical difficulties in proving
the cause of prenatal injuries, which, it was thought, might resfilt in actions
being brought in bad, faith . 2 This consideration may have had some mbrit at
a time when, as to the probable cause of prenatal injuries,, the opinion of a
physician was hardly more authoritative than that of a layman.'3 But medical
science has greatly advanced 4 and the courts have relaxed the restrictions on
the submission of medical testimony to the jury." Accordingly, as the recent
cases recognize, difficulty of proof should no longer be a reason for denying
a cause of action for prenatal injuries. Furthermore, it never should have
been since only upon trial of a cause of action can it be determined whether
competent medical testimony has been submitted to sustain a jury's finding
that there was a causal connection between the act of the defendant and the
child's injury'
As the bases underlying the earlier decisions apparently no longer have
a valid application, it is likely that the recent decisions have pointed the way for
separate being to whom a duty of care -is owed.' Ibid.-at 16. This proposition would
seem to imply that a child which has developed so that he is capable of being born alive
may recover for prenatal injuries. But, until the three recent cases, the. subsequent cases
made no such distinction. They held that even though a child is viable he is not a separate
being to whom a duty-of care is owed. See cases cited-in note 5 supra. Therefore, until
the recent cases, there could be no recovery for prenatal injuries whether the child was
viable or not.
11. In Bonbrest v.-Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 139, 140 (D. C. 1946) the court stated: "From
the viewpoint of the civil law and the law of property, a child en veiltre sa mere is not
only regarded'as a human being, but as such from the moment of conception- which it is
in fact." (emphasis added), This- was quoted with approval in Verkennds v. Corniea,
38 N. W.2d 838, 840 (Minn 1949), Also, Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 87 N. E.2d
334, 339 (Ohio 1949), quoting from PROSSER, TORTS, 189 (1941) stated:
So far, as duty- is concerned, if existence -at the time is necessary,
medical authority has recognized long since that the child is in existence
from the vinent of comception, and for many purposes its existence is
,recognized by the law. -The criminal law regards it as a separate entity,
and the law of property considers it in being for all-purposes which are
to its benefit, such-as taking by will or descent. (italics added)-
12. See Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N. W. 710 (1937) Magnolia Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
13. See Stephens, Medico-Legal A4spect. of Compromise Settleiiienti, 30 'MumI. L.
REv. 505 (1946).
14. See note 13 supra.
15. An X-ray picture, and the jnterpretaiion ofith. picture by an ,expert 'is. admissible.
Chesapeake & Q: Ry. Co. v. Kornhoff, 167 A y. 353 180.S.- W. 523 (1915):; D'ole-v.
Singer Sewing Machine Co.,'220 Mass. '327, 107 N . -949--(1915). Prof ssional or
expert witness may properly be _permitted to express his opinion as to whether 'pain
complained of by one Whom lie has attended or examinea is real or feigned.' See 28
A. L. R. 362, 97 A. L R. §248:i.S.ee Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 141 (D. C.-1946).
16. See PROSSER, TORTS 189 (,1941), .
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a cause of action which will be recognized in the future.'7 And although these
cases allowed recovery only for injuries to a viable child, it is probable that
the considerations underlying the decisions will result in recovery for injuries
to a non-viable child.'
Such a change in theory will impel the defendant to alter his tactics in
pleading and proof. To avoid liability he must show that he did not negligently
cause the injury, or prove an affirmative defense. As an affirmative defense,
contributory negligence will be unavailable since an unborn child cannot act
under its own volition. However, it might be argued, that a mother's con-
tributory negligence should be imputed to the child. Though there is no
precedent for this problem,"0 an analogous situation involves the negligent in-
jury of a child of tender years, while with his parent. The majority of juris-
dictions hold that the contributory negligence of the parent cannot be imputed
to the child.20 The propriety of this view is immaterial to the present prob-
17. In recognizing a cause of action for prenatal injuries, the courts must diverge
from the great weight of authority. This should not be a difficult matter in jurisdictions
where the problem has never been presented; and even in states where the problem has
been previously litigated the doctrine of stare decisis is not inflexible. As to whether
courts should disregard well established precedent, Crane, 3., in Oppenheim v. Kridel,
236 N. Y. 156, 164, 140 N. E. 227, 230 (1923) said:
The common law is not rigid and inflexible, a thing dead to all sur-
rounding and changing conditions, it does expand with reason. The
common law is not a compendium of mechanical rules, written in fixed
and indelible characters, but a living organism which grows and moves
in responses to the larger and fuller development of the nation.
18. If the policy judgment was that an unborn child's personal rights deserve as
much protection as criminal and property rights, then the logical conclusion would be
that a non-viable child's personal rights will be protected. See note 12 supra.
19. Since the courts have not, until the recent cases, allowed a cause of action for
prenatal injuries, the defendants have been demurring to the complaint. Therefore, the
question of imputing the negligence of the mother to the child has never been placed
before the court.
20. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co., 315 Ill. App. 209, 42 N. E.2d
883 (1942) ; Godblott Bros., Inc. v. Parrish, 110 Ind. App. 868, 33 N. E.2d 835 (1941);
Terre Haute, I. & E. Traction Co. v. Stevenson, 72 Ind. App. 435, 126 N. E. 34 (1920)
J. F. Darmody v. Reed, 60 Ind. App. 662, 111 N. E. 317 (1916); Indianapolis Street
R. Co. v. Bordenchecker, 33 Ind. App. 138, 70 N. E. 995 (1903) ; Ruffo v. Randall, 72
Ohio App. 50, 170 Atl. 871 (1934). These courts have been confronted with two con-
flicting interests. First, the interest of the child who, having exercised all the care he is
presumably capable of exercising, has been injured by the negligence of a third party.
Second, the interest of the third party who, although negligent, is required to pay all
the damages even though the parent's negligence in caring for the child contributed to
its injuries. The majority holds that the first interest outweighs the second.
Contra, Brown v. Schendelman, 34 Del. 50, 143 Atl. 42 (1928) ; Tibbetts v. Rorbach,
135 Me. 397, 198 Atl. 610 (1938) ; County Comm'rs of Caroline County v. Beulah, 153
Md. 221, 138 Ati. 25 (1927): Tucher v. Ryan, 298 Mass. 282, 10 N. E.2d 73 (1937);
Milliken v. Weybosset Pure Food Market, 71 R. I. 312, 44 A.2d 723 (1945). These
courts reason that the law does not require an infant of tender years to exercise discre-
tion, but the law imposes upon parents the duty of using reasonable care to protect those
incapable of protecting themselves. So if the parents fail to exercise such care, and the
infant is thereby brought into danger and suffers injury from the negligent act of an-
9ther, the parents' negligence is imputed to the infant.
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lem. The real issue is whether an unborn child should be treated as a very
young child under the doctrine of imputed negligence. There is a physical
difference in that the former is always completely controlled by the acts of
the mother, whereas the latter is not. And while in the cases involving a child
of tender years, the minority of jurisdictions allowing imputation of negli-
gence from the parent have been influenced by the degree of the parent's con-
trol over the child, the majority view has refused to impute negligence to the
child even where its protection was completely dependent upon the due care
of the parent.2 It appears, then, that the success of the defense of imputed
negligence will depend upon the willingness of the particular jurisdiction to
impute a parent's negligence to a born child.
So a defendant in a prenatal injuries case should anticipate the likelihood
that courts, after classifying an unborn child as a person in being for purposes
of allowing a cause of action, will further treat the unborn child as a child of
tender years in determining the validity of any defense.
21. Illustrations of this are: Child riding in automobile driven by the parent:
Carpenter v. Gibson, 80 Cal. App.2d 269, 181 P.2d 953 (1947) ; Covington v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry. Co., 99 Fla. 1102, 128 So. 426 (1930) ; Franks v. The Baltimore & 0. S. E.
Ry. Co., 269 Ill. App. 129 (1933); Gorman v. Mainzer, 149 Atl. 122 (N. J. 1930).
Mother and child riding together in the car of defendant railway company: Kelly v.
Texas & P. R. Co., 149 S. W. 349 (Tex. 1912). Mother and child walking together
along railroad tracks: Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Moore, 209 Ark. 1037, 193 S. W.2d 657
(1946).
